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At the start of December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the turbulent eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast exemplifies the defining principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on trade and conflict resolution—though how this squares with the new aerial operations in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative echoed this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This change is consequential, but analysts caution it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Apathy and Strains

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous comment on African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Conditional Intervention

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.